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I introduce the novel concept of normative events and I defend the thesis that they are normatively 
heterogeneous but metaphysically homogenous.
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In this work I introduce the novel concept of normative events and I defend two theses on the 
existence and nature of norm-related events. 
First, I maintain that norm-related events are normatively heterogeneous. In particular, there is 
a significant difference between nomophoric events (events with norm-related consequences, 
such as the acquisition of property) and nomogonic events (events themselves generating 
norms or values). 
Second, I maintain that norm-related events are metaphysically homogenous. In particular, they 
are neither abstract universals or properties, nor concrete particulars: normative events, I 
contend, are abstract particulars. 
In §2 I shall defend my first thesis: norm-related events are normatively heterogeneous. 
In §3 I shall defend my second thesis: norm-related events are metaphysically homogenous. I 
argue that normative events are abstract particulars (or tropes, as abstract particulars are 
possibly called).1
Prephilosophically, an event [evento, Ereignis, évènement, wydarzenie and zdarzenie] is a thing 
that happens: my yesterday walk, the sun rising here today, that girl’s smile, Caesar’s murder. 
For the purposes of this work, I will assume that there are events, without endorsing any 
particular metaphysical thesis. 
I shall provide quite a few distinctions about norm-related events to clear the field.2
First, there are nomophoric events: events that have norm-related consequences, that is, 
consequence established ab extra by some body of norms or rules. Birth, for instance, while 
being a perfectly natural event, has a normative valency (notably, in the Italian system, the 
acquisition of the so-called “capacità giuridica”). 
Second, there are what I call nomogonic events, that is, events that are intrinsically normative, 
events that generate norms or values, ex normative nihilo, as it were.3
1  In this work I don’t take into account what Italian legal scholars call ‘evento’, that is, the consequences of 
criminally-relevant conduct. In this reading, “evento” (Ereignis) is merely an “esito” (Ergebnis), an outcome. 
2  In this paper I just offer an abductive defense of the existence of normative events. I aim to show that they, if 
accepted, have greater explanatory power than existing theory. 
3  On a lesser note, one can distinguish also between (i) events regulated (constituted) by rules, such as a wedding and 
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Possible examples are revolutions, referenda, consuetudes (customs) or, in certain legal 
systems such as common law, prior court sentences.
(Here I am using examples taken from the law, but the phenomenon I am describing is not at 
all confined to the legal domain. One can easily think of moral systems, or “un-legal” (extra-
legal) systems, such as criminal organizations or mafias.) 
An interesting objection at this point is that there is no such thing as nomogonic events; 
rather they are at best nomophoric events, and can be reduced to them. Consider a vote by a 
legislative assembly whereby new legislation is enacted. Yes, new norms are created, but this 
is not a nomogonic event: new norms are created because other, preexisting norms regulated 
such production. I shall come back to this objection infra. 
Can nomogonic events be reduced to nomophoric events? No. In fact, neither the 
presuppositions nor the consequences of nomogonic and nomophoric events coincide. 
First, their presuppositions differ: as for nomophoric events (events generating norm-related 
effects), they presuppose the norms they refer to. Nomogonic events (norm-generating events), 
on the contrary, create new norms, possibly even without presupposing any norm at all. 
Second, their consequences differ: norm-related consequences aren’t themselves norms, but 
merely norm-regulated possible extra-normative effects. 
Third, were nomophoric events not to take place, then just some regulated consequences 
wouldn’t occur. Quite on the contrary, were nomogonic events not to take place, then we 
wouldn’t have any (new) norm, full stop. 
Using a rather well-known (but metaphysically contentious) parlance (type vs token): without 
nomophoric events, we wouldn’t have tokens; without nomogonic events, we wouldn’t have 
(new) types. 
Nomophoric events are events with norm-related consequences. In a slight more formal 
definition: 
An event is nomophoric iff the happening of that event brings about (alone or jointly 
with other conditions) certain consequences established by one or more norms. 
This seems to me the most common case, and examples abound. Births, for instance, are 
nomophoric events (in the Italian legal system). The event of someone’s birth brings about his 
or her possession of the so-called “capacità giuridica”, according to the Italian Civil Code. 
Deaths are another example of nomophoric events (at least in the Italian legal system). The 
event of someone’s death simply renders one’s crime void, extinguishing it (“La morte del reo 
avvenuta prima della condanna estingue il reato” Italian Penal Code, art. 150). 
Nomogonic events are norm-creating events. In a slight more formal definition: 
An event is nomogonic iff the happening of that event brings about (alone or jointly with 
other conditions, that may or may not take place with reference to already established 
norms) one or more norms, including norms repealing existing ones. 
Nomogonic events are intuitively more problematic to grasp, because one would need a 
precise theory of what it is for a norm to come about, to come into being (German: entstehen), 
or, symmetrically, to go out of existence (German: vergehen). 
Examples are harder to come by. I will consider three possible candidates: consuetudes, 
revolutions, referenda. 







conclusion is subject to at least two conditions: first, that consuetudes can be understood as 
events; second, what stance one takes with regard to consuetudes in a legal system. 
As for the first condition, whether consuetudes are genuine events depends on the 
metaphysical understanding of events one endorses. 
As for the second condition, one may say that the fact that consuetudes produce new norms is 
(implicitly or explicitly) already recognized in and by a legal system; therefore, consuetudes 
would make at most a case of nomophoric events (events with norm-related consequences), 
but not one of nomogonic events (norm-creating events). 
At the moment, I have no conclusive argument to solve the question of whether consuetudes 
are nomogonic events. 
Revolutions are another plausible candidate for the role of nomogonic events. Revolutions 
alter the normative status quo, bringing about new norms and canceling others, often without 
any continuity. Intuitively, revolutions are events, and therefore revolutions are a plausible 
candidate for the role of nomogonic (norm-creating) events. 
Referenda are of various kinds. In what follows I will consider what I label “constitutive” 
referenda, i.e. propositive, deliberative or legislative referenda. These kinds of referenda are 
all law-creating, and since (under plausible views of events) referenda are events, we seem to 
have a genuine example of nomogonic (norm-creating) events. 
One possible objection would be to say that these referenda are regulated by rules and norms 
already established: these referenda are surely norm-creating, but this norm creation is 
already accounted for in the general legal system. Constitutive referenda would at most be a 
case of nomophoric events, not of nomogonic events. 
One easy reply is the following: in normal cases it is true that referenda are already regulated. 
But history is full of cases of “spontaneous”, previously unregulated referenda. 
However, there is a conceptual argument for the existence of purely nomogonic events based 
on a reductio, and it is just a regressus argument. In fact, even admitting that each new norm is 
produced somehow according to a chain of previous norms, across societies, eras, and systems, 
there must be an event unconnected to previous norms originating the first ones. Of course 
this argument depends on two premises: first, that there is such a thing as norms; second, that 
norms come somehow into being, rather than co-existing at the same fundamental level as 
the rest of what there is. Not accepting either of these two premises results in the argument 
failure. 
In the preceding sections, I put forward a distinction between nomophoric and nomogonic 
events. While providing the definition and examples of nomophoric events (events with norm-
related consequences) turned out to be apparently uncontentious, the examples of nomogonic 
(norm-creating) events turned out to be strained with difficulties. 
These difficulties were threefold. First, there are difficulties caused by the metaphysical notion 
of event. Second, there are analogous difficulties caused by the notion of norm. Third, there are 
(I would say) structural difficulties in dealing with both nomophoric and nomogonic events. As 
matter of fact, every time I tried to isolate some genuine norm-creating, nomogonic event, it 
seemed that this event was already entrenched in a normative web. Thus, consuetudes create 
new norms as far as this generative mechanism is already accepted in the law; referenda are 
norm-creating if this is already accounted for by the rules on referenda. 
In one sentence, it seems that nomogonic events are never independent from prior norms or 
rules, and therefore never independent from, say, nomophoric events. This last conclusion 
seems at odds with the mutual non-reducibility of nomophoric events to nomogonic events, 
and viceversa (non-reducibility that I maintained supra at §2.1.). 
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The cause why nomogonic events seem to factually presuppose nomophoric events is 
relatively straightforward, and lies in the eye of the beholder. Nomogonic events seem to 
factually presuppose nomophoric events because I have always looked for examples in current 
(already established and highly regulated) normative systems. It is therefore quite easy to see 
that all licit means of creating new laws (say) are already catered for by existing laws. 
But this is only a contingent matter. I don’t see any conceptual reason to hold that, going back 
to “primitive” law, or considering exceptional, lawless circumstances, or moral systems, one 
cannot find example of genuine nomogonic events. 
A possible way out to reconcile the irreducibility of nomophoric events and nomogonic events 
with the fact that they seem closely related is the following. 
While being distinct and irreducible to one another, nomophoric and nomogonic events may 
be (mereologically) related: they may have parts in common, through an overlap. 
Consider the following scenario: you have a nomophoric event, that is, an event α with norm-
related consequences (a1, . . . , an). 
There is no conceptual reason to preclude the fact that the norm-related consequences a1, . 
. . , an may themselves be events. In turn, one of these event: am, (with 1 ≤ m ≤ n) may well be 
a nomogonic one, that is, it can create new norms while itself being the consequence of a 
previous, norm-related event. It must be noted that one may take the events (a1, . . . , an) to 
be ordered. The ordering between events, which we may denote as “≤”, it is not necessarily 
isomorphic to the number ordering. In fact it is more fruitful to require the event ordering to 
be a partial ordering representing a parthood relation. 
In this scenario the nomophoric event α and the nomogonic event am are distinct but related 
through their overlapping parts. (They are nonetheless distinct because it is not the case that 
every part of α is a part of am and that every part of am is a part of α. Of course this way out is 
not metaphysically neutral. In particular, it admits that events have parts, and it subsumes 
the consequences of an event into that very event). A related interesting question is what to 
make of these “mixed” events, that is, whether they constitute a genuine new type, or can be 
reduced to or subsumed in one of the other.
I have maintained that we can isolate, among generic events, a particular category of 
normative events. There are two kinds of normative events: nomophoric events (events 
with norm-related consequences) and nomogonic events (norm-creating events). I provided 
reasons to keep these two kinds distinct, and I tried to give definitions and examples of both. 
I argued that a nomogonic event can presuppose a nomophoric event without being reducible 
to it: normative events can in fact partially overlap without being reducible to one another. 
In what follows I deal with the metaphysics of normative events, and argue against normative 
events seen as objects (in §3.1), facts (in §3.3), and properties (in §3.2). I shall argue for the thesis 
that normative events are abstract particulars. 
I will argue in §3.1 that normative events cannot be considered concrete particulars; in §3.2 
that normative events cannot be considered universals; in §3.3 that normative events cannot 
be considered facts; in §3.4 that normative events are abstract particulars. In this section I 
hold that both nomophoric and nomogonic events share their nature: they aren’t abstract 
universals nor concrete particulars; normative events are abstract particulars. 







One may say that normative events can be reduced4 to objects.5 One notable proponent of 
the reduction of events to objects is (Quine, 1960): there is only one event for each and every 
spatiotemporal region, an event that coincides with the objects there. (Quine, along with 
Broad (1923), Whitehead (1929) and Goodman (1951) (among others), didn’t conceive of objects 
as three-dimensional entities, but is rather a quadrimensionalist, i.e. objects would extend 
across time exactly as they extend across space. Davidson (1980) individuates events by their 
spacetime location, causes and effects.) 
It seems unlikely that (normative) events can be reduced to objects (traditionally conceived) 
for three main reasons. First, objects are said to exist, whereas events happen (take place, 
occur). Second, objects occupy a defined spatial location, but have undefined temporal 
boundaries (whereas events have clear temporal boundaries, but often unclear spatial ones). 
Third, events tolerate co-location in a way objects don’t seem to.6
For these reasons, the reduction of events (and a fortiori of normative events) to objects seems 
to come at considerable ontological costs.7
Since properties are usually conceived of as universals, normative events could be considered 
as (normative) properties only if they are conceived of as universals. But this is controversial 
and rather counter-intuitive, because of two reasons: first. events would inherit all the 
problems of universals; second, the very possibility of token-events (of particular, one-time, 
unique events, such as my graduation last July, or — in Christian belief — Jesus’ Resurrection) 
would be ruled out.8
Of course, properties can be construed not as universals, but as abstract particulars, or tropes. 
This is the view I favor, and on which I’ll expand in §3.4. 
May normative events be reduced to facts, normative or otherwise? This remains unclear, also 
because it is unclear what facts are. On plausible reading, facts are a-spatial and a-temporal, 
whereas events (at least occurrences thereof) seem spatial and temporal. Adapting a rather 
well-known example of Ramsey (1927), the event of Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon took place in 
Gaul in 49 b.C., but that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is a fact also here and now. 
Thus, events and facts seem quite different, even if they are similar by many standards. 
In the following section I will characterize normative events as abstract particulars or tropes. 
4  The smallest and more accurate step would be to reduce normative events to normative objects. I won’t consider 
this option in this work for simplicity’s sake. 
5  I am using ‘object’, here, as a mere signpost for concrete particulars, with no commitment either to an Aristotelian 
theory of substances, or to substratum or bundle theories. Substratum theories hold that a concrete particular is a 
whole made up by a substratum — a bare particular — and its various properties; Bundle theories hold that concrete 
particulars are just clusters of their properties. 
6  For these and other general observations, see Casati and Varzi, 2010. 
7  One can also add all the objections leveled against Kim’s (1993) theory of events as concrete particulars of the 
form <object(s), property or relation, a time (or an interval of time)>. Kim also proposes existence (if the object(s) 
exemplifies the property) and identity conditions of events (point-wise identity).
8  An ingenious proposal is to treat events as properties of moments or times (Montague, 1969), during which certain 
statements hold (Van Benthem, 1983): my marriage is identified by an ordered triple <t, s, ψ> where t is the relevant 
time frame, s the relevant region in space, ψ is the sentence ’I am married to a’. It is immediately apparent how this 
proposal would be appealing for a theory of the validity of norms in a specified spatiotemporal frame. 
3.1. Normative 
Events as Concrete 
Particulars?
3.2. Normative 






FEDERICO L. G. FAROLDI
That events cannot be universals (unless we are prepared to bear high ontological costs) I have 
argued supra at §3.2. 
That normative events cannot be concrete particulars (or objects) I have argued supra at §3.1. 
It seems plausible, however, to consider events as particulars: this perspective captures some 
basic intuitions, such as the fact that they seem to have clear temporal boundaries, to have 
spatial (though unclear) boundaries, to occur or recur — all traits oddly ascribed to universals. 
These are the reasons why I shall endorse a theory of events as abstract particulars.9
Abstract particulars are instantiations (hence ’particular’) of entities of an abstract nature, 
such as properties. Of course one need not to have abstract universals to have abstract 
particulars. (In an other parlance, the existence of particular tokens doesn’t entail the 
existence of real types: types might be only conceptualized.) The orangeness of the persimmon 
I have now in my left hand, be it even the same orangeness of that book cover, doesn’t require 
“orangeness” to exist. 
It is possible to conceive of events as abstract particulars: events so characterized would 
tolerate co-location (my persimmon can be orange and at the same time round; in the same 
time and place of my walk there can also be the event of me thinking this paper) and a fortiori 
be spatial and temporal (in a way that abstract universals cannot be). 
Of course if one considers normative events to be abstract (particulars), then one has to 
explain how can “factual” consequences come from non-factual (abstract) entities. But this 
problem is — alas — common to a bunch of philosophical disciplines, from philosophy of mind, 
to the free will debate, beside metaphysics and the philosophy of normativity. 
If there is such a thing as normative events, it would be extremely pressing to investigate their 
relationships with “norms”, whatever they are. I defer a full exploration to future work; in the 
meantime let me map the field of their logical relations:
1) Normative events and norms are identical: every normative event (perhaps in the stronger 
sense of nomogonic event) is a norm, and viceversa.
2) Normative events and norms are equivalent: every time there is a normative event there is 
also a norm, and viceversa.
3) Normative events and norms are disjoint: not every norm presuppose a normative event 
(the other direction is precluded by the definition of a normative event proposed supra). 
4) Any of (1) - (3) modalized, i.e. taking into account also all possible normative events and 
norms, and not just the actual ones.
It is trivial to show that (1) implies (2), but not viceversa; and to show that (3) does not imply 
(2), and therefore it does not imply (1) either.
Obvious open questions I hope to tackle in future work remain: what are the identity criteria 
for events (conceived as abstract particulars)? What are the identity criteria for norms? To 
what extent these coincide?
To what extent admitting normative events is a step towards the so-called “legal (or more 
generally, normative) abstractism [giusastrattismo]” (cf. Faroldi 2016)? Is the existence of 
negative normative events a good explanation for phenomena like omissions, derogation and 
desuetude? 
9  The debate on abstract particulars in modern times probably started with (Stout 1923) and (Williams 1953).
3.4. Normative 
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